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Households in developing countries take various actions to smooth income or con-
sumption as a means of managing or responding to risk. One of the principal means
of smoothing income is through the diversiﬁcation of income sources, including non-
farm employment and rural-urban migration. An important consumption smoothing
strategy involves the accumulation and depletion of assets. We examine migration
and land rental market participation as responses to risk in rural China. Using a
longitudinal data set comprised of households in nine provinces in China from 1991
through 2006, we are able to test for the e ect of various manifestations of under-
lying idiosyncratic and covariate income risk on household responses. We ﬁnd that
covariate risks increase land rental market participation, but decrease participation
in migration. Idiosyncratic income risks do not a ect household rental market partic-
ipation, perhaps suggesting that intra-village risk sharing is su cient for households
to smooth consumption after experiencing idiosyncratic shocks. Because the death of
a household reduces a household’s redundant labor, these idiosyncratic labor shocks
signiﬁcantly lower the likelihood that a household will participate in migration.
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In this paper we analyze two important forms of risk management and coping strategies under-
taken by households in rural China, namely participation in land rental markets and rural-urban
migration. Because migration can serve to diversify income sources in the face of underlying risks,
we consider migration to be an income smoothing risk management strategy. Land rentals, on the
other hand, can serve as risk coping strategies if rental decisions are made in response to shocks.
For this reason, land rentals may be considered consumption smoothing strategies. In this paper
we identify the factors that lead to the utilization of these mechanisms, paying speciﬁc attention
to the types of shocks and underlying risks that elicit these responses.
Rural agricultural households in developing countries face considerable risk. Not only do in-
comes generally hover around subsistence levels, but these incomes typically su er from a high
degree of variability. There are several sources of risk that contribute to income variability for rural
agricultural households. One important source is yield risk, which can be associated with weather
variability, the incidence of diseases, pests, and many other less obvious factors (Bardhan and Udry,
1999). Other important sources of risk include economic ﬂuctuations, changes in input and out-
put prices, shocks that can a ect the stock or productivity of various forms of productive capital,
including both human and physical capital, and other random factors that a ect the states and
dynamics of demographic variables (Dercon, 2005; Townsend, 1995). Without appropriate means
of mitigating or coping with this risk or responding to the shocks inherent in these risks, households
are vulnerable to signiﬁcant declines in overall welfare; even transitory declines in income can have
large and lasting consequences for household consumption.
The literature on risk, particularly in the context of developing countries, distinguishes between
two broad classiﬁcations of risk (see, for example, the review in Dercon, 2005). Covariate risks are
common, or aggregate risks: they a ect all members of a community. These include risks such
as climate risk, macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, policy shocks, and disease epidemics. Idiosyncratic
risks, on the other hand, are individual risks: they a ect only a particular individual or household.
Examples of idiosyncratic risks include risks such as the death of a breadwinner or asset losses (e.g.,
through ﬁre or theft). While these risks may be identiﬁed as either covariate or idiosyncratic, they
1are surely not purely such; there is often both an idiosyncratic and a covariate component. Few
risks are purely idiosyncratic or purely covariate (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Dercon, 2002, 2005).
Even weather risks, which may be thought of as covariate due to the distribution of weather over a
relatively large geographic area, cannot be considered purely covariate because other heterogeneous
factors (e.g., soils) can dampen or intensify the e ects of weather shocks. Risks can be thought of
as occupying a continuum with, at one end, purely covariate risks, and at the other end, purely
idiosyncratic risks. Most risks faced by households, then, would be on the interior of this continuum,
but certain types of risks may be more threatening to certain households than others. Several
studies have suggested that the idiosyncratic component of total risk can be large relative to the
covariate component. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) use a three-period panel from Ethiopia and
decompose the variation of income from fourteen types of shocks. None of the fourteen shocks
considered have a large covariate component. The only shock for which village level variation in
income explains in excess of 40% of household variation in income is rainfall. Using data from
the Ivorian Living Standard Survey, Deaton (1997) performs a simple test whether income and
consumption changes are more similar within villages than between villages. His results suggest
that common village components do not explain much of the variation in household income or
consumption changes. This implies that idiosyncratic components are signiﬁcantly more important
in explaining variations in income or consumption than covariate components. Morduch (2005)
uses the ICRISAT data and decomposes observed household income into a base income level, a
factor that scales the base income level up or down due to covariate shocks, and a factor which
scales the base income up or down due to idiosyncratic shocks. He ﬁnds that between 75% and 96%
of total variation in household income can be explained by idiosyncratic elements. Udry (1990), on
the other hand, ﬁnds that only 42% of the variation in farm yields in a sample of Northern Nigerian
farms can be attributed to idiosyncratic risks, while the remaining 58% is due from a combination
of covariate shocks and other village-level e ects.
Rural households in developing countries can cope with risk at two stages (Morduch, 1995).
Ex ante, risk averse households can smooth income, trading o  higher expected incomes for less
variable incomes. This is generally accomplished through the process of diversiﬁcation, including
2both product diversiﬁcation and the division of household labor among farm and non-farm em-
ployment. Income smoothing is generally considered an ex ante risk management decision because
diversiﬁcation occurs in anticipation of a shock. Ex post, risk averse households can smooth con-
sumption through various channels. These include formal and informal insurance arrangements
(including risk-sharing within villages and social safety nets), borrowing or saving, and accumu-
lation or depletion of productive assets. In the complete absence of insurance markets, credit, or
adequate liquidity, or where households simply do not utilize these consumption smoothing tools,
household consumption can be closely tied to income. Farm households strive to decouple income
from consumption to reduce the volatility in household consumption that could result in transitory
consumption poverty in the event of an adverse income shock. Consumption smoothing is therefore
generally considered an ex post risk management strategy because decisions to access insurance or
credit, or to accumulate or deplete productive assets are generally made in response to a shock that
threatens consumption.
The nature of exposure to risk a ects people’s ability to manage risks. Small, frequent shocks
such as transient illnesses, are much easier for households to manage than large, infrequent shocks
such as a disability or chronic illness (Dercon, 2005). Additionally, idiosyncratic shocks can often
be managed through intra-village insurance arrangements such as risk-sharing arrangements or
social safety nets. These strategies work primarily because the shocks that are insured through
these strategies are not widespread. These strategies may be based on cultural values and mores
which are presumably shared amongst members in a community. For example, Udry (1990) found
evidence of state-contingent load repayments, where the repayment schedule was dependent upon
both the borrower’s and the lender’s production and consumption experiences. The state-contingent
nature of these credit contracts allowed risk-sharing to occur more e ectively while also conforming
to Islamic prohibitions on ﬁxed interest charges. Popkin (1979) criticizes this “moral economy”
interpretation of risk-sharing arrangements in rural societies, instead preferring a political economy
interpretation of these institutions. Foster (1988) has shown that social-risk sharing mechanisms
may be self-reinforcing. In essence, the short-term beneﬁts of shirking responsibility when it is
one’s turn to supply payments do not exceed the expected costs of forgoing future receipts (see
3also Alderman and Paxson, 1994). Numerical simulations by Coate and Ravallion (1993), however,
suggest that informal risk-sharing arrangements within villages may be very sensitive to certain
behavioral parameters. They suggest that small changes in risk aversion or intertemporal discount
factors may lead to the collapse of these arrangements. The wide persistence of these informal risk-
sharing arrangements in a wide variety of rural settings suggests that either the empirical model
in Coate and Ravallion (1993) is misspeciﬁed such that the results are overly sensitive to these
underlying behavioral parameters, or perhaps that these behavioral parameters are themselves
persistent and contribute to the self-reinforcing nature of these arrangements.
Managing covariate risks through intra-village risk-sharing arrangements is much more di cult,
and may be impossible for covariate shocks with wide e ects. Since these covariate shocks a ect
most or all of the villagers, these risks cannot be shared e ectively within a village. Instead, these
risks must be managed either through intertemporal transfers (i.e., accumulation and depletion of
savings or other stocks) or insurance or credit from outside the village. Alderman and Paxson (1994)
suggest that inter-village credit markets could exist to protect against covariate shocks, but the
e ectiveness of such markets would be limited by the extent of the covariation between inter-village
incomes. A drought, for example, which a ects incomes in multiple villages spread over a wide
geographic area, would not be insured by inter-village credit markets. Additionally, Udry (1990)
ﬁnds very little evidence of inter-village credit market activity in his Northern Nigerian data. He
suggests that asymmetric information may be the principal culprit for the absence of these markets,1
but also suggests that village-based traders may provide su cient ﬁnancial intermediation.
A large literature has been devoted to understanding precautionary savings and other consump-
tion smoothing strategies undertaken by rural households. These have often been framed in terms of
the permanent income hypothesis (see, for example, Deaton, 1992), which suggests that household
consumption decisions are not made in response to current income–which can be extremely volatile,
especially in developing countries–but rather that households base current consumption decisions
on permanent income. The empirical results of studies testing the smoothness of consumption
1Indeed, Udry (1990) suggests that one of the reasons for the state-contingent nature of loan repayments in his
Northern Nigerian villages is because information regarding the production outcomes of borrowers and lenders ﬂows
freely within the community. Outsiders would not have access to this free ﬂow of information, and this asymmetry
can lead to the collapse or nonexistence of inter-village risk sharing.
4(e.g., Wolpin, 1982; Bhalla, 1979; Meng, 2003) generally support the hypothesis that consump-
tion smoothing mechanisms are important, but incomplete. Deaton (1991) developed a theoretical
model to explain saving behavior under credit constraints. His model is able to show that asset
accumulation and depletion helps to smooth consumption. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) ﬁnd that
bullock sales allow farmers in the ICRISAT villages in India to smooth consumption during times
of poor weather outcomes. This is a particularly interesting result, since bullocks are not merely a
risk-free ﬁnancial asset (as is the asset in Deaton, 1991), but is rather a risky, productive asset. The
accumulation and depletion of bullocks, therefore, not only a ects current consumption through
being a store of wealth, but also a ects current and future income through the productive nature
of bullocks. This is not surprising, as the buying and selling of cattle is recognized as a common
consumption smoothing strategy in many rural areas (see, e.g., Binswanger and McIntire, 1987).
Nevertheless, despite their role in improving the e ciency of agricultural production, Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1993) ﬁnd that there is underinvestment in bullocks, primarily due to farmers’ overall
aversion to risk, as well as their generally low incomes and constraints on borrowing.
Morduch (1995) notes that the assumption of complete credit or insurance markets implicitly
precludes income smoothing, since the existence and completeness of these markets imply that
households are able to su ciently smooth consumption such that consumption and income are
e ectively independent. If credit and insurance markets are complete, then households ought to
make production and labor allocation decisions to maximize expected proﬁts (or income) and
access these markets as an ex post response to transitory income shocks. In other words, under
the assumption of complete markets, income smoothing violates expected proﬁt maximization. If
markets are incomplete, then income and consumption remain coupled to some degree, and we
would expect to observe risk-averse households undertaking some actions to reduce the volatility in
income. Important methods of smoothing income include the diversiﬁcation of cropping patterns
(i.e., choosing crops whose yields or prices exhibit low correlation), planting crops on scattered
plots that are subject to di erent weather shocks, using a variety of production techniques, and
blending farm and non-farm income sources (Alderman and Paxson, 1994). Traditional theories of
income smoothing suggest that risk averse households will be willing to accept lower incomes to
5ensure lower variability of incomes. As long as the returns from the di erent diversiﬁed activities do
not perfectly covary, combining diversiﬁed activities should increase expected utility for risk averse
households. An extreme example would be two activities that have the same expected returns
and the same variance in returns. Assuming at least some covariation in returns, moving from one
single activity to a diversiﬁed portfolio of both activities would simply reproduce a mean-preserving
spread of expected incomes, which would both ﬁrst- and second-order stochastically dominate other
feasible distributions. But even if the diversiﬁed activities do not have the same expected outcomes,
the diversiﬁcation of income such that overall risk exposure is reduced results in a distribution that
second-order stochastically dominates other feasible distributions. The diversiﬁcation of income
sources is an income smoothing strategy observed in many developing countries. Reardon et al.
(1992) ﬁnds evidence that households in Burkina Faso smooth income through participating in
livestock husbandry, non-farm income and migration as well as traditional agriculture. This allows
households to maintain food security despite recurrent crop failures. Kochar (1995, 1999) found
increased male labor supply among households in the ICRISAT villages, though his results suggest
that income diversiﬁcation was an ex post response to yield shocks. Not all households will be
able to respond to risks or participate in income smoothing in the same fashion. Theory would
suggest that relative risk aversion declines with incomes, and therefore wealthier households should
be more willing to invest in activities with more variable returns. Additionally, one would expect
that wealthier households would not be bound by the same credit constraints as poorer households.
Dercon and Krishnan (1996) suggests that, while risk aversion and credit constraints may play a
role in a household’s ability to participate in income diversiﬁcation, a more important determinant
may be skill or ability constraints that e ectively exclude poorly endowed households from di erent
activities. These additional constraints may explain the ﬁndings in Townsend (1995), suggesting
that relatively few households in the ICRISAT villages hold a diversiﬁed portfolio of soils, crops,
or occupations.
62 Background on Migration and Land Rental Markets in China
Rural China presents an interesting context within which to examine household responses to risk,
especially in light of the dramatic reforms in rural organization that have taken place there over
the past 30 years. One of the most important reforms has involved the nature of the rural economic
system. Starting in the late 1970s, as the whole of China’s economy became more market-oriented,
the former system of collective farming began to collapse, and the primary form of agricultural
production once again became the family farm. Collectives divided up the land amongst the
various households, allocating land on the basis of the number of workers and household size.
This was apparently a smooth transition, and has been called “the most egalitarian land reform
in history” (Walder, 2000, quoted in Naughton, 2007). An important aspect of these reforms is
that farmers were given more productive and management autonomy (Lin et al., 2003). This
“household responsibility system”, beginning in the early 1980s, marked the beginning of the end
of the collective work team system of farming, and transferred more of the responsibility for labor
allocation and the marketing of agricultural surplus to the household rather than the collective. By
1984, nearly all farming in China was under this system. As a result of these reforms, agricultural
output growth in China was dramatic. Lin et al. (2003) reports that total agricultural output grew
by 42% between 1978 and 1984, and average annual agricultural growth was 6.05% over that span.
Brandt et al. (2002) report that the gross value of agricultural output rose by an annual rate of
7.6% from 1979 to 1984, and grain production rose by 4.9% annually over the same span. Lin
(1992) estimated that nearly 47% of this growth in agricultural production can be attributed to the
introduction of the household responsibility system, even after controlling for other factors such
as higher procurement prices and lower agricultural input prices. Since households were able to
control the marketing of their output after satisfying government procurment quotas, there were
greater incentives in place to increase production.
Despite the preeminence of family farming in China, households still have no legal ownership of
the land they farm. Ownership of the land remains with the collective. Households have land use
rights to the land, granted to them under contracts signed with the collectives. These contracts
essentially guarantee households the rights to use the land for whatever purposes they so choose,
7sometimes for periods as long as 50 years. But because the ownership remains with the collective,
these rights are not absolute. In most villages, these contracts have been upheld, but in some
villages, village leaders have negated the contracts and redistributed the land or have intervened
in the uses of the land (Brandt et al., 2002). With no private ownership of land, there is very
little landlessness in rural China. The security of at least some access to land provides many
rural families a form of social insurance (Naughton, 2007). But the lack of private ownership also
diminishes the incentives for farmers to make investments in the land which would improve the
long-run productivity of the land. Why would a farmer invest in the land if there was a possibility
that the land could be redistributed in the near future? This has led some to suggest that the lack
of tenure security may explain the slowdown in output growth that came after the initial dramatic
increases in output growth following the wide scale adoption of the household responsibility system.
Brandt et al. (2002) reports that grain output grew only 0.9% per year from 1985 through 1994,
despite the central government’s e orts to improve the marketing environment. Legislation passed
in the late 1990s directed that land contracts would be for 30 years, and subsequent legislation in
2003 guaranteees farmers’ land-usage rights.
Under a system of private ownership, households are able smooth consumption through the
accumulation and depletion of assets. Productive assets, such as land and livestock, are important
components of this form of consumption smoothing, since they act not only as stores of wealth but
also as factors of production contributing to current and future incomes. Accumulating productive
assets during boom periods can positively alter a household’s long-term growth trajectory, while
depleting productive asset stocks in lean periods can have a negative e ect on the growth trajec-
tory. In addition, the transferral of land through market transactions should contribute to overall
e ciency, since households with relatively low marginal productivities of land could transfer land to
households with higher marginal productivities of land, which would allow both sets of households
to pursue activities for which they can take advantage of higher marginal productivities. In an
economy in which there is no private ownership, the management of productive assets such as land
can still play an important role in smoothing consumption, but not through the purchase and sale
of land, but rather through land rentals. Yet because of tenure insecurity and poorly-deﬁned prop-
8erty and land-use rights, the development of land rental markets in China has been relatively slow,
despite a nearly widespread allowance of these rentals. Using data from a a survey conducted in
the Chinese provinces of Hebei and Liaoning during 1995, Benjamin and Brandt (2002) found that,
on average, only about 3% of land exchanged hands in land rental markets. The results of their
empirical analysis suggest that a system of secure property rights that support land rental markets
can serve both e ciency and equity objectives. Recent legislation (including the Rural Land Con-
tracting Law of 2003) seem to be concerned with improving the functioning of land markets, and
as a result recent studies seem to suggest that land markets are developing rapidly, particularly in
coastal regions and to a lesser degree in the poorer, inland regions.
Reforms regarding labor mobility have also had a signiﬁcant impact on rural organization and
the welfare of rural households. In the early- to mid-1950s, the Chinese government instituted
a registration system, largely to monitor—not control—the dynamics of population and demo-
graphic change (Chan and Zhang, 1999). Households were required to be o cially registered in
their permanent home, and were therefore demarcated as either possessing a “rural” or “urban”
household registration, or hukou . Beginning in the late 1950s, in an attempt to slow the burden
of a massive inﬂux of peasants into the coastal cities, the central government imposed rather rigid
restrictions on the movement of people from the countryside to the cities. Yet even despite these
regulations, geographic mobility was permissible—if it was in line with the central government’s
economic priorities. The Great Leap Forward, which began in 1958, emphasized the acceleration
of industrial growth, led to signiﬁcant increases in the movement of labor from the countryside to
the cities, as farmers migrated to take advantage of better-paying factor jobs. As the Great Leap
Forward collapsed, however, living in the city had signiﬁcant advantages over living in the coun-
tryside. Despite severe food shortages, the government continued to extract agricultural output
from the countryside to provide urban dwellers with their grain rations. It was during this period
that the hukou system, as it is now understood, came into prominence. Registration status was
nearly impossible for an individual to change, and during the worst parts of China’s famine, one’s
household registration could literally mean the di erence between life and death. The mobility
restrictions deﬁned by hukou status essentially imposed a barrier between rural workers and urban
9workers.
The hukou system remains in place, and to this day only those with an urban residence permit
have the right to permanently live in cities. This residence permit is more than just a license to live
in a particular location; it also provides one with access to public services. Naughton (2007) also
notes additional beneﬁts of urban residence: (i) job security; (ii) guaranteed access to low-price
food grains; (iii) health care; (iv) pension and other retirement beneﬁts; (v) primary and middle
school education for children; and (vi) low-cost housing, supplied by the work unit. In addition to
lacking access to public services and these additional beneﬁts, migrants also face a great deal of
discrimination in employment. While recent reforms have not made it any easier to obtain an urban
residence permit, reforms have made it somewhat easier for migrants to live and work in the cities.
China’s rapid economic growth, particularly in manufacturing, has led to increased demand for
cheap unskilled labor, leading the government to relax some of their restrictions on labor mobility.
In 2005, legislation was passed suggesting that migrants have a right to live and work in the city,
and that they ought to have access to the social services available to them there.
Structural transformation is a widely-observed phenomenon in economic development, and a
key component of this process is the migration of redundant rural labor to urban centers. Such
urbanization, however, has been constrained in China primarily due to these strict limitations on
labor mobility that has made it very di cult for rural laborers to move in search of employment.
Not only does this reallocation of labor lead to increased economic e ciency, it is also a means
by which households can diversify their income sources (Rosenzweig, 1988; Paulson, 2000; Jalan
and Ravallion, 2001). Remittances from urban workers back to the countryside can constitute an
important part of a household’s total income (e.g., Du et al., 2005; Zhu and Luo, 2010), one that has
a low correlation with agricultural incomes further serving to lower income variability. Yet not all
risks should be assumed to have the same e ect on migration. Using data from Guangdong province
in China, Jalan and Ravallion (2001) ﬁnd that income risk serves as a signiﬁcant impediment to
migration, while medical risk has a small positive e ect on migration.2
2Jalan and Ravallion (2001) deﬁne income variance as the variance of estimated innovations from a serially-
correlated, household-speciﬁc error component in the household’s income equation. In other words, if household
log-income is speciﬁed as lnYit = x
 
it  + i + it, and the serially-correlated idiosyncratic error component follows an
AR(1) process such that  it =   it +  it, then the household-speciﬁc measure of income risk is the variance of the
103 Theoretical Model
Conceptually, we proceed along the lines of Yao (2000) and Feng and Heerink (2008). Consider
a risk-averse peasant household with utility function U(c, ;Zh) such that the household derives
utility from a composite consumption good (c) and leisure ( ) with household-speciﬁc preference-
shifters Zh. In general, these preference-shifters could be thought of as household demographic
features. For the purposes of this simple theoretical framework, we assume that Zh incorporates
any household-speciﬁc factor that a ects household preferences. We assume that Uy > 0, U  > 0,
Uyy < 0, U   < 0, and that the utility function is strictly concave in both arguments. Households
have a total endowment of time (L) which can be used to earn income locally from one of two
sources: agricultural production or wage labor.
Agricultural production uses inputs of land (A) and farm labor (Lf) in a concave production
function (f(·)) to produce agricultural output. We assume that technology is homogeneous across
households, but that household characteristics act as production-shifters (Qh) conditioning ﬁnal
output. While it is very likely that many of the household-speciﬁc production-shifters also serve as
preference-shifters in the household’s utility function, the vectors could be completely independent.
The production shifters could include such factors as ownership of various forms of agricultural
capital, soil quality, etc. We assume that agricultural technology is deﬁned such that land and
agricultural labor are complementary, with fLfA > 0 and fALf > 0. Agricultural production is
stochastic, subject to exogenous shocks such as weather variability, pests and disease, etc. To control
for the stochastic nature of farm output, we allow for an independent and identically distributed
random shock term,  f   IID(0, 2
f) to condition agricultural production. While we assume the
distribution of this random variable is known in advance, the actual realization is not known until
 ij, estimated as ˆ  i,y =
T  
t=1
( it    )
2 /T. If measurement error in reported income is non-systematic, but instead
is independent and identically distributed, then the income risk term is computed as ˆ  i,y =
T  
t=1
( it    )





µ is the variance of the measurement error. Medical risk is calculated as the variance of the residuals from a
regression of household expenditures on medicine, medical articles, and medical treatment on the same factors that
explain income. In other words, if Mit captures household expenditures on these medical items, then medical risk
can be computed as ˆ  i,m =
T  
t=1
( it    )
2 /T, where Mit = x
 
it  +  i +  it.
11after all resource allocation decisions have been made.
The amount of land used in production (A) is a function of the household’s endowment of land
(A) plus any land rented in (AI) less any land rented out (AO). Unlike Carter and Yao (1999, 2002),
we assume that the e ective land rental price (r) is the same regardless of whether the household
is renting in land or renting out land. Their theoretical model allows for a wedge to be driven
between the supply price and the demand price, where the wedge is a function of institutional
restrictions on land rentals. In this case, households that wish to rent in land must pay more than
the simple rental rate, while households that rent out land receive net rental payments less than
the pure rental rate. Carter and Yao (1999) suggest that, for households that rent land out, the
di erential can be viewed as political redistribution costs, while the excess cost for households that
rent land in can be interpreted as search costs. While we assume that the e ective rental rate is
the same regardless of whether households rent in or rent out land, we do allow for institutional
rigidities to limit a household’s participation in the land rental market. This is captured by local
restrictions on the volume of the various land rental transactions (AI(Z) and AO(Z)), which act
as upper bounds on households’ rental market activity.
Local o -farm labor (Lo) is employed in wage-paying collectives or enterprises at an exogenously
determined rate w. In addition to allocating labor locally, households can choose to send household
members to the city to remit a portion of earnings back to the countryside, where remittances are
a function of the household’s migrant labor, h(Lm). We assume that remittances are increasing
in migrant labor (h (Lm) > 0), but make no assumptions about higher-order curvature. As with
the land rental market, we assume that local institutional rigidities limit a household’s ability to
engage in o -farm labor and migration. These are captured by Lo(Z) and Lm(Z), which again
restrict the volume of o -farm labor and migration in which households engage.
Feng and Heerink (2008) suggests that community-level characteristics (Z) condition participa-
tion in land and labor markets. These could include such institutional factors as tenure security,
transfer rights, and social networks that a ect rental market participation as well as o -farm and
migrant labor market participation. We also suggest that, since the structural transformations
that have precipitated active land rental markets have not been uniformly distributed over time
12and space, these heterogeneities can be captured through these institutional characteristics. Be-
cause of the stochastic nature of farm incomes, households must maximize utility subject to a
stochastic budget constraint. With these deﬁnitions in place, we can summarize the household’s





c = E [f(Lf,A;Zh, f)] + wLo + h(Lm)   (AI   AO)r (2a)
L = Lf + Lo + Lm +   (2b)
A = A + AI   AO (2c)
Lo   Lo(Z) (2d)
Lm   Lm(Z) (2e)
AI   AI(Z) (2f)
AO   AO(Z) (2g)
c,AI,A O,L f,L m,L o   0. (2h)
We assume that the non-negativity constraints given in equation (2h) are slack. If we substitute
equation (2a) into the utility function (1), the Lagrangian can be written as:
L = U {E [f(Lf,A;Zh, f)] + wLo + g(Ls)+h(Lm)   (AI   AO)r, ;Zh} 
 1
 
Lo   Lo(Z)
 
   2
 
Lm   Lm(Z)
 
   3
 
AI   AI(Z)
 
   4
 
AO   AO(Z)
  (3)
The solution to this problem can be characterized by the following four ﬁrst-order necessary con-
13ditions:
LLo : Uc { E [fL( f)] + w}    1   0 (4a)
LLm : Uc
 
 E [fL( f)] + h (Lm)
 
   2   0 (4b)
LAI : Uc {E [fA( f)]   r}    3   0 (4c)
LAO : Uc { E [fA( f)] + r}    4   0 (4d)
Assuming an interior solution, equation (4a) can be written:




This suggests that, if the constraint on o -farm labor is binding ( 1 > 0), then the expected
marginal value product of labor on the farm (i.e., the shadow wage of farm labor) is less than the
o -farm wage. The imperfection of labor markets thus implies an excess supply of labor on the
farm.
Since we do not allow households to simultaneously rent in and rent out land, there can not
arise a situation in which both AI > 0 and AO > 0, and so we cannot assume an interior solution
for both (4c) and (4d). If we assume that the household participates in the land rental market,
then either:
Uc {E [fA( f)]   r} =  3 (6a)
or
Uc { E [fA( f)] + r} =  4 (6b)
If the constraints on land rentals are binding, then  3 > 0 for a household renting in land and
 4 > 0 for a household renting out land. In either case, the quantity of land that is transacted is
less than the household would choose under free market conditions. If the household is renting in
land, then equation (6a) can be written as E [fA( f)] = r +  3/Uc, suggesting that the expected
marginal value product of land is greater than the market rental rate. In this case, the household
14would optimally desire to rent in additional land until the expected marginal value product of
land is equated to the rental rate on land. The restrictions on land rental transactions prohibits
this optimal behavior. Similarly, if the household is renting out land, then equation (6b) can be
written as E [fA( f)] = r  4/Uc, and the expected marginal value product of land is less than the
land rental rate. The household would optimally desire to rent out land, driving up the marginal
value product of land until it was equated with the rental rate; again, the restrictions on these
transactions precludes this possibility.
Finally, we move to equation (4b). If we assume an interior solution, this condition can be
written as h (Lm)= 2/Uc + E [fL( f)]. This suggests that the change in overall remittances that
results from an incremental unit of migrant labor exceeds the expected marginal value product
of farm labor, even when migration is constrained. In fact, the theoretical model suggests that,
at the very least, the change in remittances associated with an incremental migrant worker are
equal to the expected marginal value product of farm labor. However, this limiting example only
holds when the constraints on additional migration are non-binding, which is not likely to hold in
practice. This result has at least one important implications. The fact that the incremental change
in remittances is at least as great as the expected marginal value product of farm labor implies that
the contribution to household income is at least as large for individuals that migrate as it is for
individuals who remain on the farm. This is consistent with literature suggesting that pull forces
dominate migration decisions in China, rather than push forces (such as landlessness, which has






+ E [fL( f)]dLm (7)
Remittances are therefore a function of the expected proportional increase in utility arising from
an additional unit of migrant labor ( 2/Uc) above and beyond the expected marginal value product
of farm labor. While we are primarily interested in migration decisions, rather than remittances,
these ﬁrst-order conditions allow us to write a migration rule as a function of these right-hand side
15terms. Speciﬁcally, we can write:
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The optimal migration decision would maximize the right-hand side of this expression. Opera-
tionally, estimation of (8) would require speciﬁcation of the functional form of h(·). Since we do
not specify this functional form, and for computational ease, we proceed with specifying a reduced
form linear model that allows us to estimate the determinants of household migration decisions.
4 Data
The data used in this paper come from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), a longi-
tudinal household survey conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease
Control and Prevention. The survey was designed to examine the e ects of health, nutrition, and
family planning policies implemented by various local and national governmental organizations,
as well as to examine the economic and social transformations of Chinese society and how these
transformations are manifesting themselves in the health and nutritional status of the popula-
tion. The survey covers roughly 4,400 households overall, with some 19,000 individuals included in
these households. The ﬁrst round of the survey was collected in 1989, with additional waves com-
pleted in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006. The CHNS data cover nine provinces in China,
mostly in Eastern or East-Central China. The provinces included in the survey are Heilongjiang,
Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi.3 These provinces are
shaded in Figure 1. A multistage, random cluster process was used to draw the samples in each
province. Within each province, counties were stratiﬁed by income (low, medium, and high) and
a weighted sampling scheme was used to select four counties in each province. While the survey
is not nationally-representative, the selected communities and survey participants demonstrate a
3The survey initially covered only eight provinces. In 1997, Heilongjiang was included in the survey when, for
unspeciﬁed reasons, communities in Liaoning were unable to participate in the survey. Communities in Liaoning were
included in subsequent waves, as were the communities in Heilongjiang that were surveyed in 1997. Because we do
not have complete coverage for Heilongjiang or Liaoning, we omit observations from these provinces.
16great deal of variation on many important socioeconomic characteristics.
The survey collects information at three distinct levels. First, information is collected at the
household level. At this level, information such as household income, asset holdings, subsidies
received, as well as information on household utilization of health and medical services is compiled.
Within households, the survey collects information on individual time and labor allocations, as well
as information on food consumption, nutritional intake, and daily activity levels. For individual
children within the household, an additional physical examination is given to measure factors
associated with childhood health and nutrition. Finally, data are collected at the community level.
At the community level, survey enumerators collect information from knowledgeable respondents on
such issues as community infrastructure, services, population, prevailing wages, and other related
variables. One of the most comprehensive aspects of the community data is the vast collection of
food price data. In the early years of the survey, data were collected on state and free market prices
for a representative basket of commodities, including such staples as rice, various types of fruits
and vegetables, and various meats. By 1997, however, there were no longer separate state prices, so
from that year on, the community surveys collected information on prices from free market stores
and large stores.
While the initial purpose of the survey was primarily to help researchers understand nutritional
transformations that have occurred in China, the socioeconomic factors that have been included
in the survey design allow for a wider set of investigations. Of particular interest to economists
is the wide variety of information collected on both individual- and household-level sources of
income, time allocations and asset holdings, and the wide variety of commodity price information
collected at the community level. For analysis of migration and land rental market participation at
the household level, we use an unbalanced panel of 5,353 observations on 1,589 households between
1991 and 2006.4 While roughly 4,400 households participated in the survey at one point or another,
only about 30% of the total households appear in each panel. Summary statistics for the data used
in this analysis are reported in Table 1.
4The sample is restricted to the 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006 waves because (a) there is no available
information by which we can identify migrants in 1989 and (b) there are no land rentals in 1989 because, for many
observations, area under cultivation in 1989 was characterized as the household’s land endowment.
17There are no speciﬁc questions in the CHNS that directly address rural-urban migration. To
determine whether an individual was a migrant during a particular survey year, we use responses to
three questions asked of the household head regarding the various members of the household. First,
household heads were asked where individual household members lived if they were not currently
living in the household. If responses to this question indicated that the household members were
living in the same county (but a di erent city, village, or neighborhood), in the same province
(but in a di erent county), in another province, or in another country, we classiﬁed members as
migrants. Second, starting in 1997 respondents were asked whether family members were still in
the house, and provided with a series of options for respondents classifying the members’ status.
A follow-up question asked how long such individuals had lived outside the household. Third, a
follow-up question asked how long these absentee members had been away from the household.
If household members were reported absent because they were seeking employment elsewhere or
had gone abroad, these individuals are identiﬁed migrants if they had been gone for any period of
time. If, on the other hand, household members were absent because they were in school or were
serving in the military, these members were not considered migrants. It is somewhat di cult to
disentangle o -farm wage labor from migrant labor, since migration can take the form of simply
moving to another village or city within the same county, which respondents might simply consider
a variety of non-farm labor. For this reason, our empirical analysis is forced to ignore equation (9a)
and instead focus on migration and land rental market participation. Our deﬁnition of “migrant”
is perhaps a little loose in this regard. Whereas the term “migrant” usually refers only to those
who leave their homes on a permanent basis, the operational deﬁnition of “migrant” used in this
analysis encapsulates both temporary and permanent workers living outside one’s o cial hometown
or village. These workers might fall more appropriately under the Chinese heading liudong renkou
(“ﬂoating population”), the term given to people living and working away from their place of
residence registration for six months or more.5
Traditional migration theory (e.g., Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970) suggests that indi-
5While the “o cial” deﬁnition only counts those that have been away from their place of registration for six
months or more, we consider anyone who has been absent for any amount of time. Our justiﬁcation for doing so
is that the surveys were conducted on a rolling schedule, and migration decisions may have been made within the
relatively recent history prior to the survey.
18viduals, viewed as rational, expected utility maximizers, base migration decisions on the expected
urban-rural real wage di erential. This expected di erential is a function of both the actual urban-
rural wage di erential and the probability of securing employment in the urban formal sector.
Converting urban and rural wages from nominal to real controls for the opportunity costs associ-
ated with migration, such that lower costs of migration are associated with higher real urban wages.
Among individual decision-makers, migration has become an increasingly common phenomenon as
both the constraints on mobility become less rigid and, as a result, network e ects in the receiving
communities lower the costs associated with migration. Figure 2 shows the increase in migration
from rural segments of the CHNS survey regions as reported across the latter six waves of CHNS
data. The ﬁgures for the year 2000 are roughly consistent with o cial ﬁgures for that year. Ap-
plying our deﬁnition of migrants to the CHNS data, we classify 13.4% of individuals as migrants
during 2000.6 Statistics from the 2000 Chinese census report over 144 million individuals (roughly
12% of the population) living for at least 6 months in a place other than where their household is
o cially registered (Liang and Ma, 2004). Of these 144 million, roughly 65 million (about 45%)
were intracounty migrants; while they lived away from their place of registration, they remained
in the same county. The remaining workers (nearly 79 million, or roughly 55%) were intercounty
migrants, those moving generally either to other counties within the same province (intraprovincial
migrants) or to other provinces (interprovincial migrants). The intracounty migrants are slightly
over-represented in the CHNS data, as we estimate roughly 58% of individuals fall into this cate-
gory. The proportion of households that participate in migration (i.e., the proportion of households
that have at least one member that migrates) is signiﬁcantly greater than the proportion of the
population that migrates. This suggests that migration is a fairly well-dispersed phenomenon, not
merely isolated to a relatively small number of households or clustered within a few particular
provinces. In Table 2, we compare the characteristics of households that participate in migration
with those households that do not participate. These simple summary statistics suggest that the
characteristics of households that participate in migration are signiﬁcantly di erent from those that
6This ﬁgure uses data from all nine CHNS provinces. The summary stastics reported in Table 1 omit observations
from Liaoning and Heilongjiang, since there is incomplete coverage of these provinces across survey waves. We use
this restricted sample in the stasticial analysis that follows
19do not. Households with migrants typically have more working-age household members, a generally
older household structure, fewer dependents, more education, and more farm capital. They also
tend to live in communities with higher wages (for both males and females) and a higher proportion
of inhabitants that have worked outside the community for an extended period of time.
In addition, the CHNS data do not explicitly provide information on households’ rental activ-
ities. Because there is no private ownership of land, land rentals represent temporary deviations
of cultivated land from a household’s land endowment. While there is no explicit coverage of land
endowments, the data do provide information on the land area cultivated in a given year. We
are able to use this information to construct a land endowment variable, from which we can de-
termine both participation in land markets as well as the overall size of land rental transactions.
To assign the household’s land endowment, we use the earliest observation on cultivated land.7
With this deﬁnition of land endowment, we measure land rental transactions as any deviation from
this initial measurement. Land rentals have been and remain a relatively small portion of total
cultivated area. Based on our deﬁnition of land endowments, we estimate that, on average, about
18% of land changed hands in rental markets in 1991. This is a higher estimate than appeared in
Benjamin and Brandt (2002). We note a couple of potential reasons for the discrepancy. First, the
geographic coverage is quite di erent. While Benjamin and Brandt (2002) only analyze data from
Hebei and Liaoning, two provinces in Northeast China, the CHNS data cover a much larger and
much more heterogeneous geographic area. Second, we note that the size of land transactions are
of a similar magnitude to those reported in Benjamin and Brandt (2002), but the di erences in
the proportions of land represented by these land transactions can be attributed to the fact that
the average size of farms in the CHNS data is signiﬁcantly lower than the size of farms in their
sample. In Table 3, we compare the characteristics of households that participate in land rental
markets with those that do not. Households that participate in land rental markets typically have
larger land endowments, more working-age household members, fewer dependents, and more farm
capital. As the legal framework reinforcing property rights has evolved, land rental activity has
7While this measure of the household’s land endowment is almost surely measured with error, this measurement
error is likely to be time invariant, and will likely be subsumed in the time-invariant error component in any panel
regressions. Assuming that this time-invariant error component is distributed independently of any explanatory
variables we may consider, then this measurement error should not introduce any signiﬁcant complications.
20increased. In 2006, we estimate that roughly 26% of land exchanged hands. Figure 3 traces out
the evolution of land rentals over the last six waves of the CHNS data.
5 Empirical Model and Methodology
The ﬁrst-order conditions given by equations (4a)-(4d) provide a series of reduced-form equations
that serve as the basis for the empirical analysis. If we ignore stochastic shocks for the moment,
then we can re-write the ﬁrst-order conditions in a deterministic framework. Speciﬁcally, we can





















Given that our theoretical model is static, we assume that households make land rental decisions
and labor allocation decisions so as to maximize a single period utility function. This implies
no evolution in the household’s land endowment or labor endowment over time. Since land is
not directly owned by the households in China, but is rather owned by the local agricultural
collective, the assumption of a ﬁxed household land endowment is realistic. The assumption of
a ﬁxed household labor endowment is more restrictive, since migration decisions can have lasting
impacts on the household’s available supply of labor with which to allocate to farm and o -farm
activities. In addition, household compositions evolve; children grow-up to become adults, adults
enter retirement, and people inevitably pass away. While we can control for this latter aspect using
the number of working-age household members as a proxy for the household’s labor endowment, we
cannot control for the dynamic e ects of migration decisions on the household’s labor endowment in
such a static model. The model can be interpreted as assuming that migration decisions are made
on a periodic basis. At the beginning of the period, household’s make their land rental participation
and labor allocation decisions to maximize single period utility. Migrants leave the countryside and
21send remittances back to the household throughout the course of the period. At the end of the
period, migrants return to the countryside and the process begins anew. While this assumption
is made to simplify the model, we stress that the maintained relationships and interconnections
between the migrant and the rural household, as well as the frequency with which migrants return
to their places of origin, make this assumption plausible.
Beginning from the theoretical predictions implied by traditional migration theory, we can write













t ) is the individual’s expected urban wage, which takes into consideration the proba-
bility of securing formal sector employment, ˜ w
f
t is the individual’s shadow wage representing the
opportunity cost of time, and xit is a vector of individual characteristics, zh
t is a vector of household
characteristics, and zc
t is a vector of community characteristics. We can treat individual migration,
M 
it, as an unobserved latent variable and choose to focus on an observed binary outcome Mit, such
that:
Mit = 1 if M 
it > 0
Mit = 0 if M 
it   0
(11)
Empirically, this model can be speciﬁed as:
Pr(Mit = 1) =  
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where Pr(Mit = 1) is the probability that individual i migrates during period t, wu





t are as deﬁned before, and the link function  (·) is the normal cumulative distribution
function. Data limitations render estimating this empirical relationship challenging. Essentially,
once individuals migrate, they are only tracked in the CHNS data inasmuch as they are still counted
as members of the households being surveyed. However, no information exists on other relevant
factors that may have conditioned their migration decision or that condition their decision not to
22return to the countryside. In addition, there are reasons to suspect that migration decisions should
more appropriately be viewed as a household decision, rather than an individual decision.
Recent contributions in the theoretical and empirical literature studying migration in devel-
oping countries have suggested that migration decisions are not made in isolation, and that the
connections with the migrant’s location or household of origin are not severed once the migrant
has moved to the city (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Stark (1991) in particular emphasized the role of
the household as the decision-making unit for rural-urban migration decisions. Studies in this new
economics of labor migration (NELM) literature have highlighted the importance of the maintained
relationship migrants and the communities from which they emigrate (e.g., Stark, 1991; Taylor and
Martin, 2001). Indeed, several studies have found that a large number of migrants often return
to their place of origin, perhaps to satisfy other lifetime ambitions such as marriage and rearing
children. Migrants often provide a valuable service to their rural counterparts who operate under
imperfect capital markets or who are otherwise constrained by inadequate liquidity, insurance, or
credit. In another study, Rozelle et al. (1999) found that, while the number of migrants in a house-
hold signiﬁcantly lowers yields (suggesting that farm households can’t simply replace migrants with
hired workers), remittances from migrants increase household’s access to farm capital, which helps
to o set the yield declines of lost labor. In this case, again, the migrants play the role of intermedi-
ary, providing to rural households what they could not obtain on their own. The increased access
to capital suggests that, when the migration decision is made at the level of the household, it may
be viewed as both a household income diversiﬁcation strategy and perhaps a growth strategy, since
the increased access to capital may permanently alter the household’s growth path. We therefore
proceed to model migration decisions as household decisions, rather than individual decisions. If
we view migration as a household decision, then equation (9b) provides an empirical framework to
test for factors that condition the household migration decision. We can write an empirical model
demonstrating the migration decision as a household decision as:





where Pr(Mhjt = 1) is the probability that household h residing in community j sends migrants in
23period t, xhjt is a vector of household characteristics unique to household h residing in community j
in period t, Ah is the land endowment of household h (presumed ﬁxed), Lh is the labor endowment
of household h (presumed ﬁxed), zjt is a vector of characteristics unique to community j in period
t, and t is a time trend. The link function  (·) is the normal cumulative distribution function.
As was the case when we considered individual decision-making, we can control for unobserved
heterogeneity in our unbalanced panel through the use of household-speciﬁc random e ects. The
results from estimating equation (13) are reported in Table 4. Household per capita gross income
and an individual’s migration decision might be jointly determined, and therefore household per
capita gross income might be an endogenous regressor in equation (13). The intuition behind
this is straightforward: per capita household income could inﬂuence the household decision to
participate in labor migration, but assuming some remittances are transferred from the migrant
back to the countryside, the migration decision could a ect contemporaneous household income,
since remittances are one of the income sources used to construct the household income data.
This would bias estimates upward. While we are unaware of any straightforward method for
incorporating a continuous endogenous regressor in this nonlinear panel data model, we can use
standard instrumental variables techniques in both a panel linear probability model (LPM) and
standard probit estimated over pooled cross-sections. For this latter regression, we control for
clustering of standard errors within household observations over survey waves. We use lagged gross
household income per capita (i.e., gross household per capita income in the previous survey wave)
as an instrument in these regressions. Assuming some form of autoregressive income process, these
lagged per capita incomes should be correlated with the endogenous, contemporaneous per capita
income terms. Because of the lagged nature of these instruments, however, these terms should not
be correlated with the contemporaneous innovations implied by equation (13). Estimates from the
instrumental variable LPM are reported in column (5) of Table 4. Estimates of the instrumental
variable pooled cross-sectional probit are reported in column (6).
Most studies examining migration in China have focused on the individual determinants of
migration, and have generally found that migrants are more likely to be male, un-married, well
educated, coming from male-headed families with more working-age members, less land, and fewer
24dependents (Zhao, 2003). Our results generally support these ﬁndings, even when we consider
the migration participation decision at the household level rather than at the individual level.
The size of the household labor force has a signiﬁcant impact on whether households participate
in migration. Households that have more working-age individuals are more likely to participate
in migration. For these households, migration is seen as a way of freeing up redundant labor.
Also consistent with previous studies, we generally ﬁnd that households with larger land area in
cultivation are less likely to participate in migration. Individuals from households with more area
under cultivation are more likely to have higher marginal value products of farm labor (assuming
the area under cultivation is not too large), which shrinks the di erential between the expected
urban wage and the opportunity cost of farm labor. Additionally, we ﬁnd that households with
a larger number of dependents relative to working-age individuals are less likely to participate in
migration. Somewhat surprising, we ﬁnd that households with a higher average level of education
are less likely to participate in migration. From Table 2, we see that households that have migrants
generally have higher average levels of education than households that do not have migrants (5.67
years compared to 5.35 years).8 This negative regression coe cient could partly be explained in that
households with higher average levels of education generally have higher marginal productivities,
which translates into higher wages or shadow wages.
In columns (1) through (4), gross household income is included in the models, despite concerns
about potential endogeneity. These results suggest that per capita income has no signiﬁcant e ect
on the household’s decision to participate in migration. When we control for endogeneity bias,
however, we ﬁnd that gross household income per capita does have a signiﬁcant e ect. Households
with lower per capita incomes are more likely to participate in migration, suggesting that households
might view migration as a path out of poverty. Taken in conjunction with previous ﬁndings, we
ﬁnd support for both “push” and “pull” forces in household migration participation decisions.
Redundant labor and land constraints apparently push migrants, while the prospects for higher
urban wages and escape from poverty pull migrants to the cities.
Additionally, several studies have pointed to “network e ects” that act as pull forces in migration
8This di erence is statistically di erent from zero at greater than the 0.001 level.
25decisions. Feng and Heerink (2008) and Zhao (2003), for example, both found a positive relationship
between a social network and the probability that an individual migrates. Having an existing social
network would be expected to lower a migrant’s employment search costs and improve a migrant’s
probability of securing urban employment. The results in Zhang and Li (2003) seem to conﬁrm this
hypothesis, ﬁnding that social networks, or guanxi , improved individuals’ probability of securing
nonfarm employment.9 The lower search costs and the increased probability of securing urban
employment lower the costs of migration, which increases the expected di erential between urban
and rural employment. While the summary statistics in Table 2 suggest that migrant households
typically reside in communities with stronger migrant networks, we ﬁnd no statistical support that
these network e ects have any impact on a household’s likelihood of migrating.
Equations (9c) and (9d) suggest that participation in land rental markets can be written as
a function of household characteristics, total land and labor endowments, the o -farm wage rate,
land rental rates, and community characteristics.10 Since the CHNS data do not explicitly address
land rental markets, we do not have information on land rental rates. Since there is likely a great
deal of spatial correlation in rental rates, much of the variation in household land rental decisions
that would otherwise be attributable to rental rates will likely be absorbed into community binary
variables. While the magnitude of land rental transactions is roughly continuous, we can model
household land rental market participation as a dichotomous decision. Households are deemed to
have participated in the land rental market if A  = A; their land currently under cultivation is not
equal to their endowment of land. We can estimate land rental market participation through a
binary choice model, whcih is well-suited for empirically estimating reduced-form equations this
sort. Taking the reduced-form equations (9c) and (9d), we can write an estimable empirical model
as:





9This hypothesis is universally accepted. Kung and Lee (2001), for example, found that utilizing social connections
did not signiﬁcantly increase the probability of securing nonfarm employment.
10The land rental market participation decision can also be framed within a latent variable context. Assume, for
the moment, that land rentals R
 
hjt are unobserved, but what is observed is a binary variable, Rhjt, indicating that
a household participated in land rental markets. This binary variable serves as the basis for the empirical analysis
that follows.
26where Pr(Rhjt = 1) is the probability that household h residing in community j participates in the
land rental market in period t, and as before, xhjt is a vector of household characteristics unique
to household h residing in community j in period t, Ah is the land endowment of household h
(presumed ﬁxed), Lh is the labor endowment of household h (presumed ﬁxed), zjt is a vector of
characteristics unique to community j in period t, and t is a time trend. The link function  (·) is
the normal cumulative distribution function. The results of estimating equation (14) are reported
in Table 5. We present instrumental variable regressions in columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 to
control for the endogeneity of per capita household income.11 It is plausible that household income
may be jointly determined with participation in land rental markets, since those that participate in
land rental markets may have higher incomes than those that do not participate.12 Indeed, we see
from Table 3 that households participating in land rental markets typically have higher incomes
than those that do not (2,945 RMB compared to 2,267 RMB per person).
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that households with larger land endowments are more
likely to participate in land rental markets, though simple participation does not inform whether
these individuals are renting in or renting out land. Because the land allocations are typically
based upon the number of farm laborers or the household size, it is possible that households with
larger land endowments may also be running up against land constraints for their laborers. If this
is the case, then larger land endowments and larger farm labor supplies could be correlated with
renting in additional land. We ﬁnd some support for this hypothesis, as the number of working-age
household members is positively correlated with land rental market participation. One could also
surmise that households with excess land endowments (i.e., more than their farm labor supply can
manage) would want to rent out land. This also would contribute to the positive coe cient on
the household’s land endowment. The household demographic structure suggests that households
may rent in land as a means of allowing dependents to contribute to household income. These
11We fail to reject the exogeneity of per capita household income in equation (14), based on simple Wald tests.
Nevertheless, we present the instrumental variables regressions to demonstrate the consistency of results across model
speciﬁcations.
12Those that rent in land may have higher farm incomes than those that do not, and those that rent out land may
have higher o -farm incomes than those that do not. In either case, participation in land rental markets could result
in higher incomes. By the same token, households with higher incomes are less credit constrained, and may be more
likely to rent in land.
27dependents may not be able to secure wage income elsewhere because they are in school during the
day or may be retired, but can still contribute to farm production.
Contrary to expectations, we ﬁnd little support for the hypothesis that ownership of farm
capital signiﬁcantly a ects a household’s land rental decisions. Only ownership of garden tractors
and irrigation equipment seem to increase the probability that a household participates in land
rental markets, and the statistical support for these ﬁndings is somewhat inconsistent across model
speciﬁcations. Part of this result could reﬂect that we examine the participation decision only,
rather than the nature of rental transactions. Owning farm capital may increase the area of land
rented in, but the lack of capital may increase the area of land rented out. In either case, households
would be participating in the land rental markets. Countervailing forces of farm asset ownership
may be confounding these coe cient estimates.
Feng and Heerink (2008) found evidence that participation in land rental markets and migra-
tion are inter-related. To reach this conclusion, the authors speciﬁed and estimated a seemingly
unrelated bivariate probit model. Since they suggest that land rental decisions are made speciﬁ-
cally by the household head, while migration decisions are made by the household as a whole, they
use the age and education of the household head to identify the land rental decision, while the
average adult age and average adult education are used to identify the migration equation. Specif-
ically, since they ﬁnd a negative correlation coe cient between the errors in the land rental and
migration equations, they determine that participation in land rental markets and participation in
migration are negatively correlated: households that are more likely to send migrants are less likely
to participate in land rentals, and vice versa. This suggests a substitutability between these two
behaviors. If we consider these behaviors as responses to risk, we can take this result as implying
that households choose to either smooth household income through migration or smooth house-
hold consumption through participation in land rental markets. Using a similar speciﬁcation, we
also estimate a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model to examine whether land rental market
participation and migration are inter-related in the CHNS data. We ﬁnd a positive correlation
coe cient among the error terms in these two equations, suggesting that, contrary to the ﬁndings
from their cross-sectional study, households that participate in migration are more likely to also
28participate in land rental markets. This estimated correlation coe cient is not statistically di erent
from zero at standard signiﬁcance levels, but the tetrachoric correlation coe cient between these
two binary variables is both positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that, at least among
the provinces represented in the CHNS data, households participating in land rental markets are
also more likely to be sending labor o  farm. From the perspective of anticipating risk, this implies
that perhaps migration and rental market participation are complementary behaviors, and may
contribute to an overall risk management portfolio.
The empirical analysis conducted up to now has generally considered only deterministic de-
terminants of households’ land rental market and migration participation decisions. If households
are sending migrants to earn income in urban formal sector employment, then such action could
be viewed as an ex ante income smoothing mechanism, made in anticipation of income variability
arising from various forms of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Similarly, if households are par-
ticipating in land rental markets, these transactions involving productive assets may be a form of
ex post consumption smoothing. There are many forms of shocks that rural households encounter.
In this analysis, we focus on a select few, but acknowledge others may exist. While there are no
direct measures of the occurrence or severity of covariate shocks in the CHNS data, we follow an
approach similar to Carter et al. (2007) and identify covariate shocks based on the proportion of
surveyed households in a community whose incomes are subject to a shortfall in a particular year.
To create poverty lines, we use the o cial National poverty lines for China and inﬂate these using
community-speciﬁc price indices provided in the CHNS data. We then compare real household
per capita income (in 2006 RMB) to these poverty lines. Assuming that households are randomly
drawn from their communities, the proportion of households in a community experiencing real in-
come poverty in a particular year should be a good proxy for community-wide income shocks. The
idiosyncratic income shocks we consider include the illness of a working-age household member,
the death of a household member, and whether a household member had to pay for a wedding,
dowry, or funeral. The frequency of these shocks are reported in Table 6. We can include each of
these shocks into the migration and land rental regressions in a piecewise fashion to see how these
shocks a ect the probability that a household participates in these various activities. We estimate
29these regressions using instrumental variable probit models using pooled cross-sections, clustering
the standard errors by households over the various waves. These results are reported in Tables 7
and 8.
From Table 7 we see that both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks inﬂuence household migra-
tion decisions. Households residing in communities that experienced covariate income shocks in a
particular year are signiﬁcantly less likely to participate in migration. This is somewhat surprising,
as it suggests that households do not attempt to smooth income through migration when con-
fronted with covariate risks. Households are more likely to participate in migration if they face a
large, unanticipated expense (e.g., paying for a wedding, a dowry, or a funeral) or if a working-age
household member experienced an illness, but less likely to participate in migration if a household
member dies. These results may suggest that, as well as being an ex ante income diversiﬁcation
strategy, migration might also be viewed by households as an ex post strategy for earning higher
incomes. This may especially be true in light of the positive and signiﬁcant coe cient associated
with paying for a large unanticipated expense. Because these expenses are unanticipated, it is not
likely that the signiﬁcant result is due to ex ante motives. Rather, it is perhaps more likely that
migration is in response to these unanticipated expenses, and may be income enhancing, rather
than smoothing.
From Table 8, we see that households are more likely to participate in land rental markets if
they experience a covariate shock, but this e ect is not signiﬁcantly di erent from zero at standard
conﬁdence levels. Since the dependent variable simply indicates participation in land rental markets,
we cannot know for sure whether experiencing a covariate shock results in households renting in
or renting out land. If households desire to smooth consumption when confronted with a covariate
shock, one would expect to ﬁnd households renting out land, temporarily depleting a productive
asset to secure additional income with which to purchase consumption goods. The nature of these
land rentals will be tested below. None of the idiosyncratic shocks have a signiﬁcant impact on
households’ participation in land rental markets. This could be due to the existence of risk-sharing
among community members, which provides a form of social insurance for households experiencing
an idiosyncratic shock. Such risk-sharing within the village or community could provide enough
30consumption smoothing that households would not need to engage in land market transactions to
ﬁll in any consumption gaps.
It is also of interest to abstract from the dichotomous migration and land rental market partici-
pation decisions and instead consider the e ects of these shocks on the number of migrants and the
area of land rented in or out. Table 9 reports the average number of household migrants and the
average area of land rented in and out per survey wave. The inclusion of these variables requires
some modiﬁcations to the econometric models that have been speciﬁed thus far. To begin with, we
recall that household migrants and areas of land rented in or out, which were previously cast as
unobserved latent variables M 
hjt and R 
hjt. Since the dependent variables will be roughly continu-
ous, we move from nonlinear probit speciﬁcations to simple linear speciﬁcations. In estimating the
e ects of various household and community characteristics on the number of migrants a household
sends, consider the simple linear speciﬁcation:
M 
hjt = xM
hjt M + zM
jt  M +   hjt +  t +  M
hj + uM
hjt (15)
In estimating the e ects of various household and community characteristics on the area of land
rented in or out, the simple linear speciﬁcation can be written:
R 
hjt = xR
hjt R + zR
jt M +   hjt +  t +  R
hj + uR
hjt (16)
In equation (15), M 
hjt is the number of migrants from household h residing in community j during
time period t, while in equation (16), R 
hjt is the area of land rented in (+) or rented out (-) by
household h residing in community j during period t. In both equations, xi
hjt, i = M,R, is a
row vector of time-varying, household-speciﬁc characteristics for household h, zi
jt, i = M,R, is
a row vector of time-varying characteristics for community j,  hjt is an exogenous income shock
experienced by household h in time t, t captures a time trend,  i
hj, i = M,R, is a time-invariant,
household-speciﬁc unobserved error component, and uhjt is an innovation independent and iden-
tically distributed across households as well as time. We have previously speciﬁed the household
and community characteristics that condition the decision to participate in land rental markets
31or migration, and we assume that the same characteristics condition the magnitude of migration
and land rentals. These models could simply be estimated using simple linear panel regressions,
or, assuming endogenous household per capita income, instrumental variables panel regressions.
Alternatively, it may be the case that migration and land rentals are inter-related. If this is the
case, then uM
hjt and uR
hjt may be correlated. Previously, we examined whether the decisions to par-
ticipate in migration and land rental markets were inter-related, but the statistical support for this
inter-relationship was rather weak. We proceed under the maintained hypothesis that the magni-
tudes of migration and land rentals, rather than simply participation, are inter-related. Household
migration and land rentals are negatively correlated, suggesting that a higher number of household
migrants is associated with households renting out land. To proceed, we estimate this system of
equations using three-stage least squares on the pooled cross-sectional data. We begin by regressing












as well as lagged gross household per capita income. Based on the estimates of
this ﬁrst-stage regression, we obtain ﬁtted values for gross household per capita income ˆ yM
hjt and
ˆ yR
hjt, which are included in an iterated seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) speciﬁcation which
assumes cross-equation correlation in the disturbances. We begin by restricting  hjt = 0, so there
are no exogenous shocks that condition household behavior. The estimates of the model parameters
under this assumption are reported in Table 10.
As we found when we examined households’ migration participation decisions, household de-
mographic structure signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the number of migrants in a household. As before,
households with redundant excess labor supply tend to send more migrants, as do those with lower
average household education. Contrary to earlier ﬁndings, we see that households with a higher
proportion of dependents relative to working-age adults tend to send more migrants. This might
suggest that these dependents can be suitable substitutes for the migrating individuals in farm
work. If there is a high degree of redundant labor on the farm due to land constraints, then
each individuals marginal value product of farm labor will generally be rather low. Freeing up
some of this redundant labor through migration can raise marginal productivities for the household
members that remain, and any labor shortages may be compensated for by these dependents.
32We also ﬁnd that households that cultivate larger areas of land send fewer migrants. This
suggests a substitutability between specialization in farming versus nonfarm activities, of which
migration is an example. If households choose to specialize in farming, then land area under
cultivation increases and they send fewer migrants to remit urban income. If they choose to send
migrants to remit income, they will generally cultivate less land.
It was earlier conﬁrmed that poorer households are more likely to participate in migration than
wealthier households. The results in Table 10 suggest that household income per capita is positively
correlated with the number of migrants in a household. While this seems to contradict our earlier
ﬁndings, we suggest that this positive correlation is primarily due to the fact that households that
have more migrants will typically have higher remittance income, which directly translates into
higher incomes per capita.
In column (2) of Table 10, we see that, as before, a household’s land endowment has a signiﬁcant
e ect on land rental market participation. However, since these regressions consider a continuum of
land rentals, we are able to ascertain the nature of land rental market transactions for households
with di erent characteristics. We see, therefore, that households with larger land endowments
tend to rent out more land, possibly because the allocated land is greater than the household can
manage. Household structure is also a signiﬁcant determinant of rentals. Households with a larger
number of working-age individuals rent out more land, as do households with a larger proportion
of dependents to working-age individuals.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence from these results that farm capital ownership signiﬁcantly a ects
land rental transactions. Households with more tractors, more garden tractors, more irrigation
equipment, and more water pumps tend to rent in additional land. Ownership of these forms of
capital allow households to take advantage of economies of scale, increase the returns to labor and
make farming more proﬁtable.
We relax the restriction that  hjt = 0 and proceed to estimate the previously speciﬁed model
allowing exogenous shocks to condition households’ migration and land rental decisions. These
estimates are reported in Table 11. The regression in column (1) incorporates a covariate income
shock. Households that experience a covariate shock tend to rent in additional land, but there is
33no signiﬁcant e ect on the number of migrants. This is a somewhat surprising result, as it suggests
that land is not rented out as a consumption smoothing response to covariate shocks. One of
the primary covariate shocks discussed in the literature is a weather shock a ecting agricultural
production over a wide geographic area. Unfortunately, the nature of the covariate shock we
consider does not explicitly cover this possibility, but instead is more a measure of community-wide
poverty. This covariate shock proxy, therefore, could capture macroeconomic ﬂuctuations or policy
shocks rather than weather shocks. This positive and signiﬁcant coe cient could be explained
by the fact that covariate shocks typically have negative e ects on asset prices, which have direct
implications for household terms of trade. The positive coe cient may suggest that the households
represented in the CHNS may take advantage of the lower rental rates on land as households in
their community scramble to rent out land in response to the covariate income shock. It may also
indicate that households view agricultural production as a safe haven income source during periods
in which poverty is widespread in their community, which may lead them to renting in additional
land so as to increase farm production.
We ﬁnd that, under this speciﬁcation, the only idiosyncratic shock that inﬂuences household
behavior is the death of a household member. While the death of a household member has no e ect
on renting in or renting out land, it reduces the number of migrants that a household sends to earn
urban income. When household members die, the extent of the redundancy of household labor is
reduced, and marginal productivity may be high enough that the expected beneﬁts of migration
are lessened.
The lack of a signiﬁcant e ect of illness on migration is consistent with previous ﬁndings. Debela
et al. (2011), for example, found households to be relatively unresponsive to illnesses in Uganda.
Reallocating labor to other activities is a commonly observed response to shocks, but when the
shock itself a ects the household’s stock of labor, as would be the case when a household member
falls ill, then the reallocation of e ort is more di cult. As a result, they ﬁnd that households do
not change their behaviors to a large degree when a ected by labor shocks.
346 Conclusion
In this paper we examine household responses to risk using a unique longitudinal data set in
China collected at various intervals from 1991 through 2006. Development theory suggests that
household can respond to risk at two distinct stages. Ex ante, household can smooth income by
diversifying income sources or production methods. Ex post, households can smooth consumption
by utilizing insurance or credit markets, or by depleting assets. In this paper, we consider both
income smoothing and consumption smoothing mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, we examine household
participation in migration and land rental markets as responses to risk.
Over the last 30 years, there have been signiﬁcant reforms in China that have increased labor
mobility and the functioning of rural land markets. While limitations still remain, the reforms
have to date increased the e ciency of the allocation of these important factors of production. We
present a simple theoretical model with stochastic farm income. Reduced form equations of the
ﬁrst-order conditions from a static household utility maximization problem frame migration and
land rentals as responses to risk, conditional on household and community characteristics.
Our empirical work suggests that households are generally more likely to participate in migration
as an income smoothing response to risk if they experience household illnesses or unanticipated
household expenditures, but are less likely to participate in migration if a household member dies
or if the community in which they reside experiences a covariate income shock. Households engage in
land market rentals as a response to covariate shocks, but not in response to any of the idiosyncratic
shocks considered. This may reﬂect well-functioning intra-village risk-sharing arrangements. These
arrangements can only protect against idiosyncratic shocks, and the fact that land rentals are not
a ected by these idiosyncratic shocks suggests that su cient consumption smoothing is available
such that households are not forced to deplete a valuable, productive asset to smooth consumption.
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41Table 1: Sample Averages of CHNS Households by Survey Wave
1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006
Household Characteristics
HH Migrant (=1) 0.107 0.123 0.327 0.404 0.523 0.654
(0.310) (0.329) (0.469) (0.491) (0.500) (0.476)
HH Participates in Land Rental Market (=1) 0.421 0.563 0.650 0.677 0.716 0.741
(0.494) (0.496) (0.477) (0.468) (0.451) (0.439)
Land Endowment (mu) 4.348 4.640 4.746 4.516 4.749 4.723
(3.087) (3.376) (3.390) (3.170) (3.647) (3.691)
# Working-age HH Members 3.028 3.153 3.281 3.253 3.407 3.939
(1.316) (1.373) (1.344) (1.205) (1.227) (1.436)
Avg. Age of HH Members 29.294 30.668 32.922 34.921 37.939 37.578
(10.072) (10.097) (9.772) (9.845) (9.938) (8.500)
Dependency Ratio 0.644 0.627 0.521 0.430 0.308 0.243
(0.572) (0.582) (0.552) (0.486) (0.472) (0.415)
Gross HH Income/Capita (1,000 RMB) 1.058 1.308 2.835 3.257 4.701 5.266
(0.832) (1.055) (2.307) (2.860) (4.498) (5.384)
Avg. Edu. Of HH Members 4.810 5.091 5.519 6.047 6.059 5.868
(2.199) (2.041) (2.108) (2.211) (2.219) (2.340)
# Tractors Owned by HH 0.036 0.039 0.053 0.060 0.094 0.121
(0.185) (0.193) (0.224) (0.239) (0.292) (0.326)
# Garden Tractors Owned by HH 0.049 0.046 0.090 0.109 0.129 0.142
(0.216) (0.209) (0.287) (0.311) (0.336) (0.349)
# Irrigation Equip. Owned by HH 0.048 0.053 0.067 0.080 0.140 0.195
(0.221) (0.240) (0.263) (0.276) (0.364) (0.529)
# Power Threshers Owned by HH 0.034 0.037 0.009 0.005 0.084 0.100
(0.202) (0.250) (0.095) (0.070) (0.277) (0.300)
# Water Pumps Owned by HH 0.059 0.054 0.087 0.128 0.237 0.230
(0.239) (0.234) (0.290) (0.335) (0.457) (0.551)
Community Characteristics
% Migrants in Community 14.662 21.978 24.532 31.778 32.038 31.095
(16.390) (19.207) (19.426) (22.610) (24.106) (19.802)
% Comm. Farmland With Irrigation 66.032 68.522 74.037 59.942 68.389 71.172
(30.525) (39.811) (28.776) (33.759) (31.771) (36.761)
Avg. Male Wage in Comm. 4.704 5.773 15.419 14.459 20.836 30.916
(2.221) (3.000) (6.189) (7.667) (6.229) (7.392)
Avg. Female Wage in Comm. 3.697 4.940 11.727 11.162 16.913 23.253
(2.021) (4.669) (5.461) (6.897) (6.260) (5.989)
Provincial Characteristics
Jiangsu 0.166 0.177 0.179 0.210 0.201 0.230
(0.372) (0.381) (0.383) (0.407) (0.401) (0.421)
Shandong 0.150 0.117 0.116 0.127 0.166 0.177
(0.357) (0.322) (0.321) (0.333) (0.372) (0.382)
Henan 0.143 0.164 0.191 0.168 0.153 0.179
(0.350) (0.370) (0.393) (0.374) (0.361) (0.383)
Hubei 0.152 0.115 0.174 0.142 0.167 0.140
(0.359) (0.320) (0.379) (0.349) (0.373) (0.347)
Hunan 0.097 0.105 0.067 0.042 0.084 0.048
(0.296) (0.306) (0.250) (0.201) (0.277) (0.215)
Guangxi 0.140 0.157 0.107 0.112 0.131 0.164
(0.348) (0.364) (0.310) (0.316) (0.337) (0.371)
Guizhou 0.152 0.166 0.166 0.199 0.099 0.061
(0.359) (0.372) (0.372) (0.399) (0.299) (0.240)
# Observations 1,267 1,110 885 810 658 621
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. The percent of migrants in the community is computed as the percentage of the
community (e.g., village or neighborhood) workforce that worked out of town for more than a month in the preceding year.
The average male and female wages in the community are daily wages, reported in Renminbi. The provincial characteristics
summarize the occurrence of binary provincial indicator variables, and can be interpreted as the proportion of the total sample
residing in each of the seven provinces considered.
42Figure 2: Migration in CHNS Provinces
Figure 3: Cultivated Area and Land Rentals in CHNS Provinces
43Table 2: Characteristics of Migrant and Nonmigrant Households in CHNS Provinces
Households w/o Households w/
Migrants Migrants
Household Characteristics
Land Area Under Cultivation (mu) 4.618 4.684
(3.166) (3.233)
# Working-age HH Members 2.888 4.182
   
(1.188) (1.237)
Avg. Age of HH Members 31.900 35.666
   
(11.277) (7.073)
Dependency Ratio 0.614 0.237
   
(0.577) (0.366)
Gross HH Income/Capita (1,000 RMB) 2.247 3.614
   
(3.008) (3.604)
Avg. Edu. Of HH Members 5.353 5.672
   
(2.285) (2.027)
# Tractors Owned by HH 0.053 0.074
   
(0.225) (0.262)
# Garden Tractors Owned by HH 0.080 0.095
 
(0.271) (0.294)
# Irrigation Equip. Owned by HH 0.076 0.106
   
(0.274) (0.383)
# Power Threshers Owned by HH 0.034 0.055
   
(0.204) (0.235)
# Water Pumps Owned by HH 0.103 0.140
   
(0.343) (0.359)
Community Characteristics
% Migrants in Community 22.494 28.911
   
(20.384) (21.838)
Avg. Male Wage in Comm. 10.794 18.420
   
(8.893) (10.553)
Avg. Female Wage in Comm. 8.449 14.339













   
(0.283) (0.226)
Guangxi 0.128 0.155
   
(0.334) (0.362)
Guizhou 0.136 0.173
   
(0.343) (0.378)
# Observations 3,692 1,647
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
44Table 3: Characteristics of Land Rental Market Participants and Non-participants in CHNS
Provinces
Households Not Households
Participating in Participating in
Land Rental Mkts. Land Rental Mkts.
Household Characteristics
Land Endowment (mu) 0.984 1.330
   
(0.707) (1.232)
# Working-age HH Members 3.107 3.411
   
(1.299) (1.360)
Avg. Age of HH Members 31.427 34.186
   
(10.105) (10.308)
Dependency Ratio 0.554 0.459
   
(0.560) (0.538)
Gross HH Income/Capita (1,000 RMB) 2.267 2.945
   
(2.432) (3.706)
Avg. Edu. Of HH Members 5.458 5.447
(2.206) (2.219)
# Tractors Owned by HH 0.044 0.071
   
(0.204) (0.257)
# Garden Tractors Owned by HH 0.069 0.095
   
(0.253) (0.294)
# Irrigation Equip. Owned by HH 0.059 0.103
   
(0.249) (0.348)
# Power Threshers Owned by HH 0.043 0.038
(0.235) (0.199)
# Water Pumps Owned by HH 0.096 0.128
   
(0.300) (0.378)
Community Characteristics
% Comm. Farmland With Irrigation 66.983 68.430
(34.784) (33.422)
Avg. Male Wage in Comm. 11.463 14.304
   
(9.212) (10.468)
Avg. Female Wage in Comm. 9.034 11.113





















# Observations 2,175 3,164
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
45Table 4: Probability of Participating in Labor Migration
Random E ects Panel Estimation Pooled
Probit Models LPM (IV) Probit (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant  3.628     3.645     3.644     3.547     0.434     3.452   
( 18.754) ( 18.946) ( 18.687) ( 17.650) ( 10.013) ( 16.764)
Area Cultivated (mu)  0.030     0.025     0.030     0.026     0.007     0.022   
( 4.126) ( 3.236) ( 3.973) ( 3.252) ( 3.485) ( 2.812)
# Working Age 0.496    0.493    0.495    0.482    0.127    0.445   
(20.948) (20.931) (20.909) (20.003) (23.504) (17.476)
Avg. Age (HH) 0.006   0.006   0.006   0.007   0.001 0.007  
(2.221) (2.154) (2.204) (2.282) (0.963) (2.466)
Dependency Ratio  0.117   0.117   0.118   0.138    0.019  0.161  
( 1.879) ( 1.889) ( 1.895) ( 2.216) ( 1.326) ( 2.029)
HH Income/Capita 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001  0.008  0.049  
(0.381) (0.327) (0.332) (0.188) ( 1.006) ( 1.975)
Avg. Education  0.041     0.040     0.042     0.037     0.007    0.022 
( 3.550) ( 3.483) ( 3.593) ( 3.202) ( 2.413) ( 1.870)
Trend 0.362    0.370    0.364    0.370    0.102    0.385   
(21.158) (21.256) (15.079) (15.055) (13.751) (14.138)
# of Tractors  0.063  0.050  0.001  0.057
( 0.635) ( 0.498) ( 0.059) ( 0.562)
# of Gard. Tractors  0.038  0.023  0.017  0.040
( 0.457) ( 0.274) ( 0.831) ( 0.518)
# of Irrig. Equip.  0.095  0.022  0.003  0.018
( 1.332) ( 0.292) ( 0.172) ( 0.258)
# of Water Pumps  0.130    0.107   0.027   0.096
( 2.014) ( 1.675) ( 1.662) ( 1.485)
% Migrants in Comm. 0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000
(0.803) (0.230) ( 0.258) (0.258)
Avg. Male Wage  0.005  0.003  0.000  0.002
( 0.908) ( 0.491) ( 0.068) ( 0.268)
Avg. Female Wage 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.005
(0.863) (0.462) (0.872) (0.703)
# Obs 5,339 5,339 5,339 5,339 4,931 4,931
# Groups 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,548
Log-Like.  2,314.282  2,310.243  2,313.484  2,297.858
Pseudo Log-Lik.  1,3590.755
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Column (6) represents probit estimates from pooled cross sections. Standard errors have been
adjusted for clustering within households over the various survey waves. The regressions in columns (4)–(6) contain provincial
dummy variables.
46Table 5: Probability of Participating in Land Rental Markets
Random E ects Panel Estimation Pooled
Probit Models LPM (IV) Probit (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant  1.346     1.337     1.432     1.400    0.129    1.074   
( 7.814) ( 7.777) ( 8.042) ( 7.467) (2.115) ( 6.004)
Land Endowment 0.212    0.208    0.209    0.214    0.056    0.202   
(7.718) (7.575) (7.623) (7.664) (6.632) (5.994)
# Working Age 0.124    0.121    0.125    0.116    0.030    0.100   
(5.591) (5.466) (5.633) (5.158) (4.200) (4.665)
Avg. Age (HH) 0.009    0.009    0.009    0.010    0.003    0.007   
(3.157) (3.261) (3.164) (3.468) (3.007) (2.596)
Dependency Ratio 0.203    0.201    0.202    0.185    0.037   0.118  
(3.605) (3.565) (3.580) (3.260) (1.970) (2.168)
HH Income/Capita 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.014   0.000 0.015
(0.930) (0.941) (1.089) (1.676) ( 0.031) (0.531)
Avg. Education  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.004  0.013
( 1.069) ( 1.088) ( 1.103) ( 1.105) ( 1.004) ( 1.112)
Trend 0.155    0.149    0.200    0.188    0.058    0.149   
(9.889) (9.283) (8.675) (8.058) (5.439) (5.417)
# of Tractors 0.085 0.034 0.017 0.067
(0.859) (0.337) (0.542) (0.719)
# of Gard. Tractors 0.074 0.103 0.047  0.131 
(0.890) (1.236) (1.785) (1.694)
# of Irrig. Equip. 0.144  0.093 0.037 0.107
(1.809) (1.157) (1.593) (1.491)
# of Water Pumps 0.018 0.003 0.004  0.002
(0.281) (0.044) (0.207) ( 0.026)
% Comm. Land w/ Irrig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.695) (0.699) (1.294) (1.148)
Avg. Male Wage  0.005  0.006  0.001  0.004
( 0.881) ( 1.026) ( 0.802) ( 0.782)
Avg. Female Wage  0.006  0.004  0.002  0.005
( 0.936) ( 0.676) ( 0.830) ( 0.900)
# Obs 5,339 5,339 5,339 5,339 4,931 4,931
# Groups 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,548
Log-Lik.  3,292.962  3,289.885  3,289.167  3,269.756
Pseudo Log-Lik.  14,627.534
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Column (6) represents probit estimates from pooled cross sections. Standard errors have been
adjusted for clustering within households over the various survey waves. The regressions in columns (4)–(6) contain provincial
dummy variables.
Table 6: Frequency of Idiosyncratic and Covariate Shocks in CHNS Provinces
Illness of Death of Wedding/Dowry/ Covariate
HH Member HH Member Funeral Income Shock
1991 24.12% 3.65% 80.44% 20.18%
1993 17.06% 4.99% 80.25% 17.48%
1997 17.61% 7.24% 80.53% 15.74%
2000 18.77% 6.18% 82.28% 11.24%
2004 30.63% 4.70% 77.31% 22.69%
2006 26.02% 5.67% 74.39% 26.16%
Total 22.23% 5.26% 79.30% 18.91%
47Table 7: The E ect of Exogenous Shocks on the Probability of Participating in Labor Migration—
Pooled Cross-Section Instrumental Variables Probit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant  3.363     3.608     3.452     3.507     3.564   
( 16.233) ( 17.225) ( 16.764) ( 16.641) ( 16.575)
Area Cultivated (mu)  0.022     0.023     0.022     0.023     0.023   
( 2.784) ( 2.921) ( 2.780) ( 2.846) ( 2.887)
# Working Age 0.451    0.443    0.442    0.450    0.453   
(17.688) (17.389) (17.316) (17.415) (17.382)
Avg. Age (HH) 0.007   0.008    0.007   0.008    0.008   
(2.391) (2.644) (2.423) (2.724) (2.793)
Dependency Ratio  0.154   0.162    0.164    0.143   0.140 
( 1.957) ( 2.035) ( 2.069) ( 1.792) ( 1.748)
HH Income/Capita  0.052    0.050    0.049    0.049    0.054  
( 2.083) ( 2.035) ( 1.983) ( 1.997) ( 2.158)
Avg. Education  0.028    0.023   0.022   0.021   0.026  
( 2.324) ( 1.938) ( 1.809) ( 1.724) ( 2.161)
# of Tractors  0.035  0.065  0.054  0.050  0.032
( 0.342) ( 0.642) ( 0.533) ( 0.492) ( 0.321)
# of Gard. Tractors  0.059  0.036  0.037  0.036  0.047
( 0.763) ( 0.461) ( 0.480) ( 0.462) ( 0.605)
# of Irrig. Equip.  0.019  0.013  0.016  0.018  0.012
( 0.267) ( 0.191) ( 0.228) ( 0.253) ( 0.177)
# of Water Pumps  0.096  0.101  0.099  0.095  0.102
( 1.482) ( 1.561) ( 1.531) ( 1.468) ( 1.576)
% Migrants in Comm.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
( 0.216) (0.164) (0.257) (0.274) ( 0.271)
Avg. Male Wage 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002 0.001
(0.074) ( 0.145) ( 0.249) ( 0.280) (0.183)
Avg. Female Wage 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.245) (0.686) (0.666) (0.729) (0.236)
Trend 0.398    0.386    0.385    0.385    0.397   
(14.293) (14.148) (14.120) (14.127) (14.259)
Covariate Income  0.582     0.562   
Shock ( 3.667) ( 3.538)
HH Paid for Wedding/ 0.158    0.142  
Dowry/Funeral (=1) (2.826) (2.519)
HH Member Experienced 0.076 0.071
Illness (=1) (1.358) (1.270)
Death of HH Member (=1)  0.168  0.179
( 1.539) ( 1.639)
# Obs 4,931 4,931 4,931 4,931 4,931
# Groups 1,548 1,548 1,548 1,548 1,548
Log-Lik.  13,554.695  13,583.849  13,589.453  13,586.053  13,544.563
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering within households over the various survey
waves. All regressions contain provincial dummy variables.
48Table 8: The E ect of Exogenous Shocks on the Probability of Participating in Land Rental
Markets—Pooled Cross-Section Instrumental Variables Probit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant  1.115     1.040     1.070     1.066     1.076   
( 6.208) ( 5.613) ( 5.980) ( 5.901) ( 5.709)
Land Endowment 0.202    0.202    0.202    0.202    0.202   
(6.002) (5.980) (5.989) (5.983) (5.971)
# Working Age 0.099    0.101    0.101    0.099    0.100   
(4.602) (4.688) (4.733) (4.584) (4.606)
Avg. Age (HH) 0.007    0.007   0.007    0.007   0.007  
(2.636) (2.554) (2.613) (2.512) (2.529)
Dependency Ratio 0.116   0.118   0.120   0.115   0.116  
(2.135) (2.174) (2.211) (2.088) (2.099)
HH Income/Capita 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.017
(0.569) (0.540) (0.556) (0.538) (0.607)
Avg. Education  0.011  0.013  0.014  0.013  0.012
( 0.956) ( 1.104) ( 1.143) ( 1.132) ( 1.003)
# of Tractors 0.059 0.069 0.065 0.067 0.057
(0.626) (0.736) (0.697) (0.714) (0.615)
# of Gard. Tractors 0.135  0.130  0.129  0.131  0.132 
(1.747) (1.684) (1.670) (1.691) (1.709)
# of Irrig. Equip. 0.106 0.107 0.105 0.107 0.105
(1.487) (1.491) (1.467) (1.492) (1.464)
# of Water Pumps  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.002 0.001
( 0.016) ( 0.014) ( 0.009) ( 0.027) (0.010)
Avg. Male Wage  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.005
( 0.872) ( 0.800) ( 0.790) ( 0.781) ( 0.890)
Avg. Female Wage  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.004
( 0.745) ( 0.900) ( 0.880) ( 0.904) ( 0.732)
% Comm. Land w/ Irrig. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.239) (1.130) (1.101) (1.140) (1.168)
Trend 0.146    0.148    0.148    0.149    0.146   
(5.213) (5.405) (5.409) (5.414) (5.200)
Covariate Income 0.185 0.180
Shock (1.368) (1.330)
HH Paid for Wedding/  0.034  0.027
Dowry/Funeral (=1) ( 0.703) ( 0.557)
HH Member Experienced  0.044  0.043
Illness (=1) ( 0.950) ( 0.927)
Death of HH Member (=1) 0.025 0.027
(0.264) (0.287)
# Obs 4,931 4,931 4,931 4,931 4,931
# Groups 1,548 1,548 1,548 1,548 1,548
Log-Lik.  14,592.668  14,622.518  14,626.653  14,625.292  14,587.355
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering within households over the various survey
waves. All regressions contain provincial dummy variables.
Table 9: Number of Migrants and Area of Land Rental Transactions in CHNS Provinces
1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006
Avg. Number of Migrants per Household 0.1278 0.1697 0.5000 0.6042 0.8298 1.2931
Avg. Area Rented In (Mu) 0.6875 0.8545 0.9535 0.9863 1.1827 1.1515
Avg. Area Rented Out (Mu) 0.4516 0.7533 0.9675 1.0543 1.1743 1.3304
Number of Observations 1,268 1,108 884 811 658 621




Constant  1.129      2.467     
( 14.428) (8.618)
Land Area Cultivated (mu)  0.026     
( 7.614)
Land Endowment/Capita (mu)  1.598     
( 41.575)
# Working Age 0.330       0.175     
(34.070) ( 5.164)
Avg. Age (HH)  0.001  0.011   
( 0.634) ( 2.463)
Dependency Ratio 0.149       0.340     
(5.731) ( 3.649)
HH Income/Capita 0.029      0.007
(2.178) ( 0.142)
Average Education  0.031       0.064     
( 5.826) ( 3.272)
# of Tractors  0.072 1.214     
( 1.592) (7.509)
# of Gard. Tractors  0.050 1.293     
( 1.357) (9.972)
# of Irrig. Equip.  0.021 0.872     
( 0.621) (7.194)
# of Water Pumps  0.087      0.188 
( 2.948) (1.763)
% Migrants in Comm.  0.000
( 0.639)
%. Comm. Farmland w/ Irrig. 0.001
(0.993)
Avg. Male Wage 0.001  0.017 
(0.452) ( 1.822)
Avg. Female Wage 0.002 0.001
(0.728) (0.111)






2 Land Rentals 0.319
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates obtained assuming correlation in the error structures across equations.
All regressions contain provincial dummy variables.
50Table 11: The E ect of Exogenous Shocks on Labor Migration and Land Rentals—Pooled Cross-Section 3SLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrants Rentals Migrants Rentals Migrants Rentals Migrants Rentals Migrants Rentals
Constant  1.137      2.388       1.148      2.511       1.130      2.467       1.161      2.489       1.193      2.445     
( 14.367) (8.242) ( 14.052) (8.385) ( 14.445) (8.617) ( 14.633) (8.554) ( 14.195) (7.915)
Land Area Cultivated (mu)  0.026       0.027       0.026       0.027       0.027     
( 7.610) ( 7.692) ( 7.599) ( 7.714) ( 7.784)
Land Endowment/Capita (mu)  1.599       1.599       1.598       1.600       1.601     
( 41.600) ( 41.587) ( 41.574) ( 41.566) ( 41.606)
# Working Age 0.329       0.179      0.329       0.174      0.329       0.175      0.333       0.177      0.331       0.180     
(33.957) ( 5.270) (34.022) ( 5.133) (33.909) ( 5.147) (34.142) ( 5.175) (33.805) ( 5.244)
Avg. Age (HH)  0.001  0.010      0.001  0.011      0.001  0.011      0.000  0.011      0.000  0.011   
( 0.609) ( 2.398) ( 0.578) ( 2.487) ( 0.655) ( 2.461) ( 0.103) ( 2.490) ( 0.040) ( 2.451)
Dependency Ratio 0.148       0.346      0.149       0.340      0.148       0.340      0.160       0.347      0.158       0.353     
(5.703) ( 3.712) (5.731) ( 3.644) (5.683) ( 3.644) (6.064) ( 3.666) (5.986) ( 3.729)
HH Income/Capita 0.029      0.005 0.029      0.006 0.028      0.007 0.029      0.006 0.029      0.003
(2.198) ( 0.093) (2.173) ( 0.133) (2.160) ( 0.141) (2.176) ( 0.128) (2.175) ( 0.070)
Average Education  0.031       0.060       0.031       0.064       0.031       0.064       0.030       0.065       0.030       0.061     
( 5.700) ( 3.031) ( 5.845) ( 3.263) ( 5.788) ( 3.272) ( 5.596) ( 3.300) ( 5.462) ( 3.063)
# of Tractors  0.074 1.195       0.073 1.216       0.071 1.214       0.068 1.213       0.070 1.195     
( 1.631) (7.378) ( 1.603) (7.521) ( 1.567) (7.507) ( 1.511) (7.499) ( 1.541) (7.371)
# of Gard. Tractors  0.049 1.304       0.049 1.292       0.049 1.293       0.047 1.293       0.044 1.302     
( 1.316) (10.046) ( 1.328) (9.964) ( 1.332) (9.968) ( 1.286) (9.966) ( 1.188) (10.028)
# of Irrig. Equip.  0.021 0.872       0.021 0.872       0.020 0.872       0.021 0.872       0.019 0.872     
( 0.617) (7.195) ( 0.611) (7.195) ( 0.592) (7.190) ( 0.607) (7.195) ( 0.567) (7.194)
# of Water Pumps  0.087      0.189   0.088      0.189   0.088      0.188   0.087      0.188   0.089      0.189 
( 2.944) (1.770) ( 2.964) (1.772) ( 2.974) (1.763) ( 2.956) (1.761) ( 2.996) (1.775)
% Migrants in Comm.  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
( 0.550) ( 0.684) ( 0.629) ( 0.618) ( 0.568)
%. Comm. Farmland w/ Irrig. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.096) (0.978) (0.987) (0.974) (1.057)
Avg. Male Wage 0.001  0.019  0.001  0.018  0.001  0.017  0.001  0.017  0.001  0.019 
(0.399) ( 1.949) (0.471) ( 1.837) (0.458) ( 1.822) (0.433) ( 1.822) (0.406) ( 1.957)
Avg. Female Wage 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.802) (0.304) (0.731) (0.112) (0.708) (0.112) (0.760) (0.106) (0.819) (0.297)
Trend 0.167      0.093  0.168      0.100    0.168      0.100    0.168      0.100    0.167      0.093 
(12.508) (1.908) (12.642) (2.037) (12.633) (2.042) (12.601) (2.040) (12.478) (1.903)
Covariate Income Shock 0.045 0.396  0.046 0.392 
(0.705) (1.743) (0.718) (1.714)
HH Paid for Wedding/Dowry/Funeral (=1) 0.021  0.044 0.024  0.030
(0.850) ( 0.496) (0.962) ( 0.335)
HH Member Experienced Illness (=1) 0.024  0.004 0.023  0.002
(1.037) ( 0.048) (0.962) ( 0.028)
Death of HH Member (=1)  0.114    0.068  0.113    0.079
( 2.441) (0.404) ( 2.421) (0.467)
# Obs 4,931 4,931 4,931 4,931 4,931
R2: Migration 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.389 0.389
R2: Land Rentals 0.320 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.320
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates obtained assuming correlation in the error structures across equations in each model. All regressions include binary provincial
indicator variables.
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1